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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE RIGHT OF NONDISCLOSURE-
THE UNINTENDED VICTIM OF THE MARKLE MURDERS. McCam-
bridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).
In the early morning hours of November 16, 1987, the Little
Rock Police discovered the bullet-riddled bodies of John Markle, his
wife, and their two daughters. At four a.m. Markle called Richard
Lawrence, Markle's attorney, and asked him to come to his home.'
Lawrence summoned the police to meet him at the Markle home,
where they found an outer storm door unlocked with the main door
open about half an inch. Lawrence saw a briefcase inside the door,
and taped to it was a paper with his name and address written in red
ink.2 The patrolman entered the house and found Markle's body in
his office. He then radioed for assistance and secured the crime scene
with the aid of another patrolman.
The detectives took photographs of the crime scene and the bod-
ies and seized as evidence the briefcase along with other articles, in-
cluding a letter to Markle's mother, appellant Mercedes
McCambridge.3 Subsequent tests on the guns found at the scene
showed that Markle fired them prior to his death and that the guns
fired the bullets that killed his family.4 Therefore, the Little Rock
Police Department considered the matter closed.5
Lawrence and McCambridge filed suit against both the City of
Little Rock and the Little Rock Police Department to prevent disclo-
sure under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)6 of
documents seized and the crime scene photographs from the Depart-
ment's official files.7 The trial court held that the FOIA required dis-
1. 298 Ark. 219, 223-24, 766 S.W.2d 909, 910-11 (1989).
2. Id. at 223, 766 S.W.2d at 911.
3. Id. at 224, 766 S.W.2d at 911. The police seized and photocopied two handwritten
letters from Markle to his attorney (Lawrence), Markle's diary, a handwritten letter from
Markle to his mother (appellant Mercedes McCambridge), and miscellaneous notes. The
detectives also found a note from Markle stating that he murdered his family and committed
suicide. The contents of the briefcase were returned to Lawrence after photocopying. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to 107 (1987). The statute sets forth what constitutes
a public record and a public meeting. It establishes the penalty for those people who willfully
and knowingly violate the statute at a fine not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200) or thirty
days (30) in jail or both. The statute further provides for the examination and copying of
public records and sets forth the exceptions to the disclosure requirement.
7. Id. at 224-25, 766 S.W.2d at 911. The court reduced McCambridge's constitutional
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closure. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted a temporary stay
preventing disclosure pending a decision by the court. After oral ar-
guments, the court dissolved the stay and ordered disclosure.8 The
court dismissed as invalid all of McCambridge's arguments except the
privacy claim. 9 The court then determined that the state's interest in
disclosure outweighed McCambridge's privacy interest in nondisclo-
sure."° McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766
S.W.2d 909 (1989).
The interpretation of a statute turns upon the interests with
which the statute is concerned." Because the Arkansas Legislature
passed the FOIA strictly for the public's interest, the Arkansas
Supreme Court, beginning with Laman v. McCord,2 has interpreted
the statute liberally to effect those interests. Other federal and state
courts have taken a similar approach."3 For the Arkansas FOIA to
arguments to five basic assertions: the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (1) provides for
warrantless search and seizure without probable cause, (2) provides for the taking of property
without due process, (3) violates equal protection, (4) unduly chills free speech, and (5) violates
her constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 226, 766 S.W.2d at 912.
8. 298 Ark. at 225, 766 S.W.2d at 911.
9. Id. at 226, 766 S.W.2d at 912. Of these assertions, the court held that only the claim
to a violation of her constitutional right to privacy was valid. The court held McCambridge
did not have standing to challenge the search and seizure, as it is a personal right and may not
be asserted by a third party. The police seizure of evidence does not constitute a taking, nor
does the release of information under the FOIA, therefore there was no denial of due process.
Id.
The court denied McCambridge's claim of an equal protection violation because no "sus-
pect class" or "fundamental right" is involved in the exception to the act. See Id. at 226-28,
766 S.W.2d at 912-13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(7) (Supp. 1987). This exception al-
lows for nondisclosure of "unpublished memoranda, working papers, and correspondence of
the Governor, Legislators, Supreme Court Justices, and the Attorney General." Id.
The court also denied her claim that the FOIA chilled free speech. The court held she
had no standing to base a challenge on the grounds of free speech because she did not assert
that her speech was chilled. 298 Ark. at 228, 766 S.W.2d at 913.
10. Id. at 228-32, 766 S.W.2d at 913-15. See infra notes 138-61.
11. Warfield v. Chotard, 202 Ark. 837, 153 S.W.2d 168 (1941).
12. 245 Ark. 401, 404, 432 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1968). See also, Arkansas Gazette Co. v.
Southern State College, 273 Ark. 248, 250, 620 S.W.2d 258, 259-60 (1981), appeal dismissed,
455 U.S. 931 (1982); Commercial Printing Co. v. Rush, 261 Ark. 468, 472-73, 549 S.W.2d 790,
793-94 (1977).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (1987) provides:
It is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and
public manner so that the electors shall be advised of the performance of public offi-
cials and of the decisions that are reached in public activity and in making public
policy. Toward this end, this chapter is adopted, making it possible for [the public],
or their representatives to learn and to report fully the activities of their public
officials.
13. See, e.g., Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir. 1974); Webb v. City
of Shreveport, 371 So.2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
424
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require disclosure, the material must (1) be requested by a citizen of
Arkansas, (2) constitute public records, and (3) not fall within a listed
exception. 14
The question of whether the requested records constitute public
records is the first major hurdle for the requesting party. The original
Arkansas FOIA defined public records as those of a governmental
agency or other agency supported in whole or in part by public funds
or expending public funds.'5  The Attorney General has interpreted
the definition of "public funds" as encompassing federal, state, and
local funds. 16 This broad definition avoids the troubles created by a
"laundry list" and gives the courts some flexibility. 17 In 1984 the At-
torney General issued another opinion stating that the courts and leg-
islative committees are subject to the FOIA as the "public funds"
definition applies. I8
In addition to the "public funds" provision, records which by
law are required to be kept are subject to examination by a requesting
party.' 9 The Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted this statute liter-
14. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a) (Supp. 1987) provides: "Except as otherwise specifi-
cally provided by this section or by laws specifically enacted to provide otherwise, all public
records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the State of Arkansas during
regular business hours of the custodian of the records." Id. (emphasis added). The federal
FOIA states that "any person" may request disclosure of a public agency's documents. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982). Federal courts have interpreted this to mean any person regardless
of citizenship, residency, or purpose in obtaining the documents. See Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 790 n.3 (6th Cir. 1972); Souice v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (1967) (now codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 25-19-103 (1987)) provided: " 'Public records' are records made, maintained or kept by any
public or governmental body, board, bureau, commission or agency of the state or any political
subdivision of the state, or organization, corporation or agency, supported in whole or in part
by public funds, or expending public funds."
16. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-79 (1979) (statute providing that all public funds coming
into the possession of county officers must be remitted to the county treasury, includes federal
funds received by the county). See also Wood Bros. Const. Co. v. Bagley, 232 Iowa 902, 6
N.W.2d 397 (1942).
17. See, e.g., Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Southern State College, 273 Ark. 248, 620 S.W.2d
258 (1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 931 (1982); McMahan v. Board of Trustees, 255 Ark.
108, 499 S.W.2d 56 (1973).
18. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-91 (1984). The opinion stated that a commission or
board that meets in private to determine whether to reprimand a licensed professional, i.e.,
physicians, nurses, real estate agents, is subject to the FOIA. The exception to disclosure is for
the reprimanding and such of a police officer or employee. But see Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.
v. Appeals Court, 371 Mass. 539, 362 N.E.2d 1189 (1977) (the court refused to allow examina-
tion of records held by the Commissioner of Banks when they were part of the court's files in
an injunctive action to obtain removal of bank officers).
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2804 (1967) (now codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 25-19-105 (1987)) provides that "all state, county, township, municipal and school district
records which by law are required to be kept and maintained shall be open to inspection and
copying by any citizen of the State of Arkansas. .... "
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ally in McMahan v. Board of Trustees.2" This suit involved a request
for a list of persons who received complimentary tickets to University
of Arkansas football games and the number of tickets received. 2' The
court stated that the FOIA was not ambiguous and applied only to
those records required by law to be kept and maintained.22 The court
expressly rejected the proposition that any records, required or not,
which are kept by a state agency are subject to examination under the
FOIA.23
Eight years later, in Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Southern State Col-
lege 24 the court required disclosure of records of the Arkansas Inter-
collegiate Athletic Conference showing disbursements to student
athletes .2  The court relied on an earlier ruling in North Central Asso-
ciation of Colleges v. Troutt Bros.26 and an amendment to the original
statute27 to hold the records subject to the FOIA. The court stated
that the general rule under the FOIA required disclosure, and nondis-
closure exceptions would be narrowly construed.28
As stated earlier, the Arkansas Attorney General has broadly in-
terpreted the "public funds" requirement due to the general rule
favoring disclosure. 2a However, in 1983, the Attorney General issued
an opinion stating that the mere receipt of Medicare/Medicaid funds
by a hospital does not constitute a sufficient connection to make an
otherwise private hospital subject to the FOIA.3 0 In 1988 the Attor-
20. 255 Ark. 108, 499 S.W.2d 56 (1973). Accord Welch v. Seery, 411 A.2d 1351 (Vt.
1980).
21. 255 Ark. at 108, 499 S.W.2d at 57.
22. Id. at 111, 499 S.W.2d at 58.
23. Id.
24. 273 Ark. 248, 620 S.W.2d 258 (1981).
25. Id. at 249, 620 S.W.2d at 259.
26. 261 Ark. 378, 548 S.W.2d 825 (1977) (holding that a voluntary association of public
institutions which conducted business through a private nonprofit corporation was subject to
the FOIA).
27. 273 Ark. at 249-50, 620 S.W.2d at 259. The amendment to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-
2803 (Supp. 1979) (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103 (1987)), expanded the defi-
nition of "public records" to include writings "which constitute a record of performance or
lack of performance of official functions which are or should be carried out by a public official
or employee, a governmental agency, or any other agency wholly or partially supported by
public funds or expending public funds."
28. Id. at 250, 620 S.W.2d at 259-60.
29. See, e.g., Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-63 (1978) (student government association at
UALR is subject to the FOIA due to the receipt of public funds); Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-
156 (1977) (corporation operating as the alter ego of the city by providing a public utility
constitutes a bureau commission, or organization supported by public funds or expending pub-
lic funds and is subject to the FOIA).
30. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-163 (1983). However, the opinion further stated that
when activities of a private organization and a public agency become intertwined, the private
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ney General issued another opinion"' in a fact situation similar to
North Central.32 Here the organization was nonprofit and used public
employees to operate state equipment in state facilities.3 3 Although
the nonprofit corporation reimbursed the university for the use of the
equipment, the Attorney General believed it was insufficient to pass
the liberal interpretation hurdle of the FOIA 4 established in Laman
v. McCord and its progeny.35
The intent of the Arkansas FOIA is for public business to oper-
ate in an open and public manner so that the public has knowledge of
their officials' performance, decisions, and policy-making activities.36
The public records definition presently includes those records kept by
public employees within the scope of their employment.37 The Attor-
ney General has interpreted this and other relevant portions of the
FOIA to mean that arrest records of people apprehended by police
constitute public records.38 Moreover, the Attorney General has
stated that, due to the enlargement of the definition by the legislature,
McMahan v. Board of Trustees39 no longer controls with respect to
records which a public body maintains even though not required to
do so by law. 4' This broad definition also provides for disclosure of
information given to a public body or agency by a third party not
connected with the public body or agency.4 However, another Attor-
ney General opinion appears to place some limits on this broad inter-
pretation.42 It suggests that the public body or agency must take
some type of action on the records before it becomes a public record
organization may become part of the public agency for limited purposes and subject to the
FOIA. See Informal Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. (April 17, 1985) (a nonprofit hospital that received
funds from a bond issue passed by a board established by the city was subject to the FOIA due
to the strong involvement of the city through the board).
31. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 88-004 (1988).
32. 261 Ark. 378, 548 S.W.2d 825 (1977). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
33. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 88-004 (1988).
34. Id.
35. 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968). See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
37. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(1) (1987) provides that "[a]ll records maintained in
public offices or by public employees within the scope of their employment shall be presumed
to be public records."
38. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-59 (1982).
39. 255 Ark. 108, 499 S.W.2d 56 (1973).
40. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-59 (1982). See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-79 (1984) (applications for chancellor or presi-
dent of an Arkansas university constitute public records); Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-190
(1983) (personal financial statements required as part of the AIDC grant application process
exempt because disclosure most likely constitutes a "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy."
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (repealed by 1985 Ark. Acts 468 § 1, at 917)).
42. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-26 (1980).
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under the FOIA.43
Records which are classified as public records must be examined
to determine if any statutory exemptions apply.' The Arkansas
Supreme Court ruled in Laman v. McCord45 that exceptions to the
FOIA are created only by statute and not by common law.46 Almost
a decade later, the court softened its position in Commercial Printing
Co. v. Rush.47 This case involved an executive meeting48 of the Board
of Corrections concerning alleged wrongdoing of employees after an
inmate in their charge died.49 The court stated that the exception for
executive sessions dealing with personnel matters equals the policy
reasons for a'liberal construction.50 The court went on to state that
the act "should be construed with reference to the public policy or
policies it was designed to accomplish." 5 ' This approach reflects the
rule in several other jurisdictions.5 2 However, some courts refuse to
apply a narrow and restricted interpretation of an exception if to do
so defeats the purpose of the exemption. 3
The custodian of the records will make the initial determination
of whether an exemption applies.5 4 The Supreme Court of Michigan
ruled in Tobin v. Michigan Civil Service Commission5 that the FOIA
authorizes, but does not require, nondisclosure of exempted materi-
als. 6 The United States Supreme Court adopted this interpretation of
the federal FOIA in Chrysler Corporation v. Brown.57 The Arkansas
43. Id
44. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
45. 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
46. Id. at 405, 432 S.W.2d at 755.
47. 261 Ark. 468, 549 S.W.2d 790 (1977); accord Baxter County Newspapers v. Medical
Staff of Baxter Gen. Hosp., 273 Ark. 511, 622 S.W.2d 495 (1981).
48. The public was excluded from this meeting.
49. 261 Ark. at 471, 549 S.W.2d at 792-93.
50. Id. at 473, 432 S.W.2d at 793.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, (1976); Morrison v. School
Dist. No. 48, 53 Or. App. 148, 631 P.2d 784 (1981); City of Dubuque v. Telegraph Herald,
Inc., 297 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1980); Mans v. Lebanon School Bd., 112 N.H. 160, 290 A.2d 866
(1972).
53. See, e.g., Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1977);
Campbell v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 539 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1976); City of Dubuque
v. Telegraph Herald, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1980).
54. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-8 (1983).
55. 416 Mich. 661, 331 N.W.2d 184 (1982).
56. 416 Mich. at 667, 331 N.W.2d at 186 (suit filed to prevent disclosure of public em-
ployee labor organization's list of names and addresses of state's classified civil service
employees).
57. 441 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1979).
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statute58 apparently makes nondisclosure mandatory and thus leaves
the records custodian with no discretion."9 When a public record
contains both exempted material and public material, the Attorney
General has stated that the public material should be segregated from
the private material.6" In United States Department of Justice v. Re-
porters Committee for Freedom of the Press6 the United States
Supreme Court adopted this policy of segregation of public and ex-
empted data.6 2 This view is consistent with those of various other
jurisdictions.63
The federal FOIA 64 and most state FOIAs6  contain an exemp-
tion from disclosure when disclosure constitutes an invasion of pri-
vacy. The United States Supreme Court expanded the exemption in
Department of State v. Washington Post Co.66 At one time, the Ar-
kansas FOIA contained such an exemption.67 However, in 1985 the
Arkansas Legislature passed an amendment to the FOIA which re-
pealed the personal privacy exemption.6 This left the FOIA with no
protection for personal privacy interests. In 1987 the Legislature
passed another FOIA amendment6 9 to afford protection for personal
privacy interests in the disclosure of personnel records. 70  However,
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b) (Supp. 1987) provides within: "the following shall
not be deemed to be made open to the public under the provisions of this chapter." (emphasis
added).
59. Watkins, Access to Public Records under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 37
ARK. L. REV. 741, 785 (1984).
60. See Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-37 (1975) (segregate data covered by the Arkansas
Air Pollution Code and public data prior to disclosure); Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-230
(1973) (certain items required by statute to be confidential in personnel records must be segre-
gated from public data).
61. 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989).
62. Id. at 1485.
63. See, e.g., State ex rel Stephen v. Harder, 230 Kan. 573, 641 P.2d 366 (1982); Nichols
v. Gamso, 35 N.Y.2d 35, 315 N.E.2d 770 (1974).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982) provides exemption for "personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy."
65. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(c) (West Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.878(l)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a
§ 3(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
66. 456 U.S. 595 (1982). The court held the exemption applies to any information con-
cerning a person, regardless of the type of file, so long as disclosure constituted a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy. Id. at 602.
67. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (Supp. 1983) (repealed 1985) provided exemption for
"compilations lists or other aggregations of information of a personal nature where the public
disclosure thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
68. 1985 Ark. Acts No. 468 § 1.
69. 1987 Ark. Acts No. 49 § 1.
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(10) (Supp. 1987) provides exemption for
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combining the presumption in favor of disclosure7" and strict con-
struction of the exceptions7 2 results in the conclusion that, in close
cases, the balance tips in favor of disclosure.7 3
The initial inquiry under the federal FOIA 4 and generally under
state FOIA statutes75 is whether the information is of a "personal na-
ture" to the extent that disclosure would be an invasion of privacy.76
Courts have looked to both the traditional tort concept of privacy and
the constitutional right to privacy in determining the nature and sig-
nificance of the personal privacy interests involved. The tort concept
protects personal privacy interests relating to information of such a
highly embarrassing or intimate nature that it is not disclosed to
strangers. 77 The constitutional right to privacy has two differing pur-
poses as determined by the United States Supreme Court in Whalen v.
Roe. 78 The first purpose protects the individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure,79 while the second protects the interest in making certain
types of important decisions.8 0 Since the personal privacy exemption
no longer exists in the Arkansas FOIA,8" a person must rely on the
constitutional right to privacy to prevent disclosure 2 when outside
the realm of personnel records.8 3
The right to privacy emerged initially through the writings of
Justice Louis Brandeis.84 He defined the right to privacy as "the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."85 The common law protects the individ-
"[p]ersonnel records to the extent that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy."
71. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
73. See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 382 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
75. See, e.g., Morrison v. School Dist. No. 48., 53 Or. App. 148, 631 P.2d 784 (1981).
76. See supra notes 44-46, 64-66 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 580 P.2d 246 (1978); Hubert v.
Harte-Hanks Texas Newspapers, Inc., 652 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App. 1983).
78. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
79. Id. at 599.
80. Id. at 599-600.
81. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
82. E.g., McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).
83. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
84. Brandeis developed this concept through court opinions and law review articles such
as Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) and Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
85. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Bran-
deis' view concerning privacy failed to gain acceptance by the majority of the court. Olmstead
concerned the operation of the fourth and fifth amendments in relation to wiretapping per-
formed by the government. Justice Brandeis argued that this wiretapping constituted an un-
430 [Vol. 12:423
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ual's right to determine the extent to which private matters will be
disclosed to others.8 6 This right to control the disclosure is lost when
the individual makes disclosure to the public.8 7 These writings of Jus-
tice Brandeis constitute the basis for the modern right to privacy. 8
The modem right to privacy doctrine originated in Griswold v.
Connecticut 9 in which the Supreme Court held that a statute which
made it illegal for married persons to use contraceptives violated the
constitutional right to privacy.9" Prior to Griswold,91 no court-defined
right had existed to engage in private acts.9 2 Although the Court at-
tempted to establish a specific right to privacy, 93 a workable definition
reasonable search and seizure and the use of conversations as evidence compelled the
defendants to be witnesses against themselves. Id. at 471-78. The argument posed by Justice
Brandeis was based on a law review article he wrote with Samuel Warren. See Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 84. The article concerned the intrusion of newspapers into private mat-
ters rather than governmental intrusion. The authors examined the possible sources of a right
to privacy and in the end concluded that it did not come from a property interest, contract
interest, or from a special trust, but constituted rights against the world. Id. at 205, 213. They
stated that this was not a new application of an existing principle, but rather a new principle.
Id. at 213 n. 1.
86. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 84, at 198. No matter what form the expression of a
personal matter takes, the individual is entitled to decide whether he will give it to the public.
Id. at 199.
87. Id. at 199.
88. ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 18.26, at 555 (1986).
89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. Id. at 480. However, the majority in Griswold had difficulty distinguishing this right
to privacy from cases which relied on substantive due process. ROTUNDA, supra note 88,
§ 18.27, at 558. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state statute re-
quired all children to attend public rather than private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (state statute prohibited the grade schools from teaching in a language other than
English). The Court struck down both statutes as repugnant to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court found no valid public interest which related to the restric-
tions on individual freedoms.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Griswold majority, stated that the constitutional right to
privacy is established by the "penumbras" and "emanations" of several amendments to the
Constitution. 381 U.S. at 484. He cited the right of association under the first amendment,
prohibition of troops staying in one's home in peace time under the third amendment, protec-
tion from unreasonable search and seizure by the fourth amendment, self-incrimination protec-
tion by the fifth amendment, and' the ninth amendment's guarantee that no one's rights shall be
construed to deny others' rights. These combined rights constitute the penumbra of rights
which create the right to privacy. Id.
91. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
92. ROTUNDA, supra note 88, § 18.27, at 559. Prior to Griswold, the right to privacy had
been restricted to the dissents. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (challenge to Connecticut's anticontraceptive statute); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (suit over wiretapping and the use of those
conversations as evidence in court).
93. ROTUNDA, supra note 88.
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of that right remains elusive. 94
The Court again attempted to define the right to privacy in
Whalen v. Roe.95 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that
privacy cases involve at least two different interests.96 The first, and
the one at issue in McCambridge,97 consists of the individual's interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.9 The second consists of
the liberty interest in making certain important decisions.99
The right of nondisclosure arose once again in Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services."°° The former president challenged the
constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preser-
vation Act.10 ' The Court recognized that even the President is not
without some constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of
his personal life which are unrelated to his acts as a public official., °2
However, neither of the above cases stated the standard of review
used for the right of nondisclosure. 103 This failure to delineate a stan-
dard of review has resulted in confusion within the circuits. The
Third"° and Fifth Circuits'0 5 have adopted a balancing test more
94. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 15-2, at 1304 (1988). There exist
three basic reasons for this lack of an operative definition. First, the destruction of the Lochner
era's model of implied limitation in the 1930s prevents its use to define the elements of personal
freedom. Second, neither negative language to control the state nor identifying areas beyond
governmental reach is sufficient to define this right. Third, due to the interdependence of
people today, the definition cannot consist of areas which are completely self-regarding or
wholly personal. Id. at 1304-05.
95. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). This case concerned an action challenging the constitutionality
of a statute which required doctors to provide the state with copies of prescriptions for certain
drugs. Id. at 591-92. The statute also provided for security measures to protect information
while in the state's possession. Id. at 595.
96. Id. at 599-600.
97. 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).
98. 429 U.S. at 600. See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Court upheld
the statute, saying the disclosure of the records did not constitute an invasion of any right.
The Court did take note of the threat to privacy due to the vast accumulation of information
by the government. Id.
99. 429 U.S. at 600-01; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
100. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
101. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1970 ed., supp. V). Professional archivists were to examine all of
the former president's papers and segregate the personal materials from the public materials.
433 U.S. at 429.
102. 433 U.S. at 457.
103. This failure to establish a standard of review creates problems for a court as it applies
this right. See, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
104. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980). In deter-
mining that an employee has a constitutional right to privacy in his medical records, the court
adopted a balancing test between the degree of personal intrusion and the government's inter-
est in the intrusion, and held the government's interest required disclosure. Id. at 577-80. The
court found a constitutional right to privacy relating to the records, but this right was out-
weighed by the government's interest in investigating dangers to the safety of the employees.
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common to due process claims than strict scrutiny analysis under the
equal protection clause.1 °6 The Sixth Circuit refused to even recog-
nize a right to nondisclosure in J.P. v. DeSanti. °7 This decision, how-
ever, has been sharply criticized. 0 8
The Supreme Court established in Roe v. Wade ' 9 that the con-
stitutional right to privacy protects only fundamental privacy inter-
ests." This leads to the conclusion that only those interests which
constitute fundamental interests possess constitutional significance in
questions of nondisclosure."' The Supreme Court determined that
for a right to be "fundamental" it must be "implicit in the concept of
See also Doe v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mc-
Kenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N. 1978).
105. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
106. Id. at 1134. The court based its reasoning on several factors. One was the fact that
the Supreme Court had avoided the establishment of a standard of review and warned against
strict scrutiny involving new fundamental interests. The court also reasoned that subjecting
financial disclosure to the same scrutiny afforded marriage, contraception, and abortion would
open the floodgates on many other common forms of regulation. Id.
107. 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981). See also St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. Califor-
nia, 643 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1981); Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1977). In
DeSanti, the plaintiffs attempted to enjoin the compilation and dissemination of social histories
by the state in cases involving juveniles. 653 F.2d at 1081-82. The court refused to enjoin the
state relying on Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The court did not conclude that Whalen
overruled Paul. 653 F.2d at 1088-89. In Paul the Supreme Court held that disclosure by
police of an adult's arrest does not violate his constitutional right to privacy. 424 U.S. at 713.
In DeSanti, the court held that the juveniles' social histories were analogous to the arrest
records in Paul and disclosure did not violate the constitutional right to privacy. 653 F.2d at
1090.
108. See Comment, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Disclosure of a Personal Matter:
Perfecting Privacy Analysis in J.P. v. DeSanti, 71 GEO. L.J. 219 (1982) (authored by Bruce
Falby). Falby created a three-part definition of a "personal matter." Id. at 240. The Arkansas
Supreme Court adopted this definition in McCambridge. 298 Ark. 219, 230, 766 S.W.2d 909,
914 (1989). " 'Personal matter' is information (1) that the individual wants to and has kept
private or confidential, (2) that except for the challenged action can be kept private or confi-
dential, and (3) that to a reasonable person would be harmful or embarrassing if disclosed."
Comment, supra at 240.
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110. Id. at 153. The Court ruled that the basis of the right to privacy is the fourteenth
amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action. The due process
clause is determined to contain two prongs. The first constitutes procedural due process which
is notice and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
The second prong establishes limits on the government's authority to take away liberty. This
is substantive due process. Liberty may not be taken away unless the deprivation bears a
reasonable relation to a state purpose. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). State action that deprives one of these liberties must pass stricter
scrutiny than the rational relation test. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977).
111. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152; J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir.
1981). A combined reading of these cases reveals that not all interests in nondisclosure possess
a constitutional dimension.
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ordered liberty."'"12 The Court in Whalen 113 held that the right of
nondisclosure 1 4 constitutes part of the fundamental right to pri-
vacy." 5 This right to privacy protects only those rights which are
fundamental.116 Therefore, the right to nondisclosure of personal
matters could arguably constitute a fundamental right by its very
definition. 117
For an interest in nondisclosure to warrant constitutional protec-
tion, it must meet an objective definition of a personal matter.118 This
definition should include both prongs of the right to privacy and not
be limited to the autonomous decision-making areas. 119 The Court in
Whalen 120 defined a personal matter as one that is "personal in char-
acter and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed."' 121
No right of privacy is absolute. 1 22 Therefore, a court utilizes a
particular standard of review to determine if the state action impinges
on the right to nondisclosure of private matters. In so doing, it must
consider the nature of protection afforded fundamental rights 123 by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The usual stan-
dard of review for a fundamental right is strict scrutiny. 12 4 However,
112. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
113. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
114. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the interest in avoiding dis-
closure in relation to the right of privacy).
115. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
117. See Comment, supra note 108, at 239.
118. See Comment, supra note 108, at 239.
119. See Comment, supra note 108, at 239. The very fact of living in an organized society
results in the deprivation of some privacy. Id. The basis of the right to privacy, due process,
exhibits the balance struck between the liberty of the individual and the demands of society.
This balance is the one struck by the country "having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradi-
tion is a living thing." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
120. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
121. Id. at 605. The context of this quote exhibits the Court's sympathy for the right of
nondisclosure. The Court states that the vast amount of information by the government poses
a threat to the right to privacy. The right to collect this data also carries the duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosure.
122. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
123. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. These rights include marriage, see Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); procreation, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
contraception, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), see also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); education of children, see
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); family relations, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
124. State action must be necessary for a compelling government interest to justify the
deprivation of a fundamental right. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113; Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479.
434
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the Supreme Court has used a balancing test which recognizes the
shifting interests between the individual and the government.
125
However, the Court failed to enunciate the standard of review in
either Whalen 126 or Nixon. ' 27 The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted
the balancing test in McCambridge rather than the traditional strict
scrutiny analysis.
1 2 1
The Third Circuit applies the balancing test when the intrusion
involves a "zone of privacy."' 129 The Fifth Circuit uses the balancing
test when considering the nondisclosure of privacy claims, 30 but
strict scrutiny' 3 ' when considering the autonomy of decisionmak-
ing. 132 The Fifth Circuit states that balancing must demonstrate more
than "mere rationality" to justify disclosure.133 Failure to apply this
standard results in public disclosure requirements that apply to
anyone. 1
34
If the balancing of interests need only rise to the level of rational
relation, then this would strip the fundamental rights of their consti-
tutional clothing. 35 However, by requiring the balance to be
greater' 36 on the state's end for disclosure, courts would not strip the
right of its fundamental character. 37
The Arkansas Supreme Court followed the general reasoning of
125. Eg., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113.
126. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
127. 433 U.S. 425; but see supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
128. 298 Ark. 219, 231, 766 S.W.2d 909, 915 (1989). The court relied on Nixon as the basis
for adopting the balancing test.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980).
This case dealt with an intrusion into the zone of privacy surrounding medical records. The
court held the intrusion allowable when the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the indi-
vidual interest involved.
130. See, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981).
133. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134. The rationality test reflects minimum scrutiny.
134. Id. After citing Plante, the court in Fadjo looked to Nixon to support a standard
requiring more than a mere rational relationship between disclosure and the state interests.
633 F.2d at 1176. The court noted the limited intrusion into the ex-President's personal
materials was substantially outweighed by the public interest. Id.
135. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text (discussing the special liberties and the
protections afforded them).
136. Comment, supra note 108, at 244-45.
137. Failure to apply a level of balancing greater than the rationality level of scrutiny may
in effect create different levels of privacy. Rights that are fundamental and subject to strict
scrutiny if exercised under the decision-making prong may not be protected from disclosure by
the other side of the right to privacy. This would result in the state not being able to regulate
the autonomy decision-making areas, but could require disclosure of the exercise of that right.
The court in Plante warned against this result. 575 F.2d 1119.
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the federal cases in McCambridge v. City of Little Rock.'38 Appellant
McCambridge filed suit to prevent the disclosure of Markle's diary, a
letter to McCambridge from Markle, miscellaneous notes, and the
photographs of the victims. 139 The court denied all claims by Mc-
Cambridge, but did recognize that she possessed a valid constitutional
privacy claim. 110
The court acknowledged the Supreme Court's ruling in Paul'4'
that the right to privacy does not bar disclosure of records of official
acts, but refused to extend this to information off the public record. 42
The court then identified the right to nondisclosure as stated in
Whalen '13 and adopted the test' for a "personal matter" established
by Falby.'4 5 The court then determined that Markle's diary, the letter
from Markle to his mother, and the photographs to be the personal
matters of McCambridge.1
4 6
The court applied a balancing test to determine if the state's in-
terest in disclosure under the FOIA outweighed McCambridge's pri-
vacy interests in nondisclosure. I" The result was the disclosure of all
the matters that were deemed personal.'48 The government had a
strong interest in disclosure of the photographs to depict how the
crime occurred, why the police closed the case as a murder-suicide,
and why there was no need for further action. 
4
Justice Purtle strongly dissented from allowing disclosure.' 50 He
stated that any purpose for disclosing the photographs had long since
faded and they should be like witnesses, no longer part of the rec-
ord. '5 The media or public can have no legitimate expectation to
examine the photographs of every homicide.' 5 2
The disclosure of Markle's diary was held probative of the nature
138. 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).
139. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (facts of the case).
140. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
141. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
142. 298 Ark. at 228, 766 S.W.2d at 913 (citing Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir.
1981)).
143. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
144. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
145. 298 Ark. at 230, 766 S.W.2d at 914.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 231, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
148. Id. at 231-32, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
149. Id. at 231, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
150. Id. at 238, 766 S.W.2d at 919 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. Justice Purtle further stated that all that needs to be said about these photographs
is contained in the majority's opinion. Id.
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and course of the crime by showing his serious financial trouble and
suicidal thoughts. 153 The court stated highly valued governmental in-
terests permitted the disclosure of these factors.I54 Justice Purtle once
again dissented to this disclosure, saying the diary did not in any way
aid in the solution of the crime.'55
The court determined that McCambridge's strongest interest in
nondisclosure involved the letter from Markle. '5 6 However, the court
allowed disclosure because of the letter's relation to the murder-sui-
cide and to the determination as to how and why the homicides oc-
curred.' 57 The court further acknowledged the public's strong
interest in announced solutions of crimes.158 Justice Purtle stated that
this letter does not come under the FOIA and that "decency and re-
spect for the dead and living surely demand that this material not be
commercialized." 59
The ruling in this case will significantly impact Arkansas law for
several years to come. The establishment of the test for what consti-
tutes a personal matter is arguably the most notable feature of this
case. The FOIA has almost always referred to some type of personal
matter, yet the statute provided no guidance as to how to define a
personal matter. 16 The most immediate application arises from the
FOIA itself dealing with personal matters contained in personnel
files. '61 The test may weave its way into tort law concerning personal
matters or other areas where a specific definition of a personal matter
is needed.
Also significant is the use of the balancing test by the court. The
court clearly recognized a constitutional right to nondisclosure of per-
sonal matters 62 as one of the two prongs of the fundamental right to
privacy. 1 63 The court followed the trend in federal courts by adopting
the balancing test in favor of strict scrutiny analysis. 1 However, the
court appears to utilize only a rational level of scrutiny in balancing
153. Id. at 231, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 239, 766 S.W.2d at 919-20 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 232, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 239, 766 S.W.2d at 920 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
160. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
161. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(10) provides exemption for: "personnel records to
the extent that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy." See also Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-077 (1989).
162. 298 Ark. at 228, 766 S.W.2d 913.
163. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
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the competing state and individual interests. No language exists in
the decision that requires a much greater state interest than individual
interest before the courts permit disclosure.I65 If the Arkansas
Supreme Court intended only minimum scrutiny of state interests, the
warning in Plante'66 has gone unheeded. The state must be required
to demonstrate a standard greater than mere rationality, or public dis-
closure interests could prevail in almost any situation.'67 The court
failed to recognize the Arkansas Attorney General Opinion requiring
the segregation of personal matters from public records prior to dis-
closure.' 6 It appears that disclosure is an all or nothing situation
which provides complete protection for purely personal matters or no
protection of personal matters that are intertwined with public
records.
The immediate effect of this ruling allows the interpersonal rela-
tions of a family to be made public without their consent. 169 Under
the ruling of this court, any items seized on a crime scene are available
for public inspection.170 This severe limitation on a recognized funda-
mental constitutional right makes the adoption of the balancing test a
veritable rubber stamp for disclosure because the scales are tipped so
far toward disclosure that only an irrelevant personal matter retains
protection of the constitutional right of nondisclosure.
Of the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of some such protec-
tion, there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press is overstep-
ping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the
165. The court failed to state why the government's interest in disclosure outweighs the
individual's interest in nondisclosure. The court simply stated the government's interest out-
weighed the individual's interest. The language with regard to actual balancing, when it ex-
isted, merely stated that it aided the police or was probative to the case. Apparently all that is
required for the government's interest to outweigh the individual's interest is that disclosure
somehow aid the police, or is the least bit probative. As a result, almost any government
interest in disclosure can trump a fundamental right.
166. 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).
167. Id. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
169. "The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of
culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more
essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon
his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by
mere bodily injury." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890).
170. 298 Ark. at 237, 766 S.w.2d at 236 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
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171. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 169, at 196.

